Epstein Secrets

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

seeks the information "in the context of a public investigation in which the assertion of a privilege might be of critical importance." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295). The court concluded, "

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

o pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in

ts '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

o pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

o pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in

t could have filed a writ of mandamus, since "mandamus lies to compel a judge to unseal documents shown to be material and necessary in litigation," United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Government has done neither of the above; instead, it has moved pursuant to the All Writs Act. I

odification on these grounds, I address this factor in light of the current proceedings before the Second Circuit. The term is not well understood. See United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that the Circuit "provided no guidance as to what might constitute `impr

seeks the information "in the context of a public investigation in which the assertion of a privilege might be of critical importance." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295). The court concluded, "

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

o pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

o pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in