Epstein Secrets

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 40 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 35 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 35 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Alzmad, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 112 United States v. Ahmed, 10

el, 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 155 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 122, 148 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 166 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 114 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

9 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Ci

Resp. 141. "Similar character," for purposes of F.R.E. 8(a) "means nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects or having a general likeness." United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980). The alleged perjury in an unrelated defamation case more than 20 years after the fact bears no likeness to a

r purpose; (2) it is relevant to a material issue in dispute; and (3) its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect...." LaFlam, 369 F.3d at 156. There is no proper purpose for the admission of any of the alleged perjury which occurred decades after the charges in Counts 1-4.

under Rule 404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any proper purpose other than to demonstrate criminal propensity. United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.2004). The rule, however, is not "a carte blanche to admit prejudicial extrinsic act evidence...." United States v. Scott

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the July, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's interactions with Minor Victim-3 is admissible to prove the defendant's

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the July, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's interactions with Minor Victim-3 is admissible to prove the defendant's

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's interactions with Minor Victim-3 is admissible to prove the defendant's

Resp. 141. "Similar character," for purposes of F.R.E. 8(a) "means nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects or having a general likeness." United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980). The alleged perjury in an unrelated defamation case more than 20 years after the fact bears no likeness to a

under Rule 404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any proper purpose other than to demonstrate criminal propensity. United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.2004). The rule, however, is not "a carte blanche to admit prejudicial extrinsic act evidence...." United States v. Scott