Epstein Secrets

the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States' attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy. The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone d

gime began to recalculate the probability of survival and their interests. The regime has not unraveled, but it is unraveling. The speculation over al Assad's whereabouts and heavy fighting in Damascus is simply part of the regime's problems. Rumors, whether true or not, create uncertainty that the regime

ven the historical record, risks bloody anarchy. And a transitional phase may require an implicit deal between the United States and Iran. Iran and the United States have a record of dealing with each other behind the scenes; the Bush administration and the ayatollahs did likewise in Iraq even as they fought eac

the Syrian leader. It is true that Iran's prospects of keeping Syria as its own Mediterranean outpost are probably linked with the survivability of al Assad's regime. But his removal might well hasten the slide into chaos within Syria and in adjacent Lebanon, rather than slow it. Al Assad's departure coul

t in 2008—making that state the second-largest U.S. oil producer. With such changes happening so fast, it's timely to consider their implications. A United States hopelessly dependent on imported oil and natural gas is a thing of the past. Most energy experts now project that North America will have the capac

84025 preserving Syria's secular military regime without al Assad. But it is unclear how long a Western-backed regime resting on the structure of al Assad's Syria would survive. Even the best outcome has its own danger. And while Lebanon itself has been reasonably stable in recent years, when Syria catc