Epstein Secrets

in United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544-52 (3d Cir. 2002), holding that "when a United States Attorney negotiates and contracts on behalf of `the United States' or 'the Government' in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United States Attorneys wi

79) 13, 14 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 7 United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660 (2d C

t because Annabi did not address the circumstances of this case; it is also consistent with fundamental fairness. As the Third Circuit cautioned in Gebbie, individual U.S. Attorney's Offices should not view themselves as "sovereigns of autonomous fiefdoms" with the ability to charge a defendant with t

ests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such prosecution"). Thus, the 8 EFTA00066001 NPA's references to the "United States" demonstrate a definitional intent not to limit such provisions to the USAO-SDFL. The NPA begins with several factual recitals. After noting certai

e government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United States Attorney and/or the US

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

ests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such prosecution"). Thus, the 8 EFTA00099364 NPA's references to the "United States" demonstrate I definitional intent not to limit such provisions to the USAO-SDFL. The NPA begins with several factual recitals. After noting certai

e government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not prohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL ("USAO-SDFL"), but by "the United States." This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references elsewhere in the NPA to the United States Attorney and/or the US

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 118-20 (2d Cir. 1998) (defendant pled guilty in EDNY to using the passport of another person to enter the United States and later charged in SDNY with related, but distinct terrorism offenses); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2004) (defenda

20 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 17 United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) 21 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3rd Cir. 2002) 14, 15, 16, 17 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 16 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2