Epstein Secrets

until, at the earliest, a suspect's initial appearance before a judicial officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 6. *1246 On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Attorneys and Law Firms Paul Cassell, University of Utah Co

words of the statute as they are commonly and ordinarily understood and must construe the statute so each of its provisions is given full effect." P United States it McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (I I th Cir. 1995). Therefore, "[w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire

nt Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001). We are bound to "presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said." Id. (quoting P. United States it Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en bane)); see alsol° Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035. Therefore, under the plain la

the Majority, Judge Tjoflat's concurring opinion, and I agree that the Executive has exclusive and complete authority over charging decisions. See? li United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to deci

tence" and, indeed, in his closed criminal case. 28 U .S .C. §2255(a)—(f); see also Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 3(b) (stating that once the inmate has filed his motion with the clerk, "[t]he clerk must file the motion and enter it on the criminal docket

.. . it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment."' Cap/in & Drysdale, Chartered v. UnitedStates, 491 U.S. 617, 633 (1989) (citations omitted). 'The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair oppor

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted.'" United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakers v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment right

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

tered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but one count. Id. The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's 170 EFTA0

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

tered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but one count. Id. The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's 170 EFTA0

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

tered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but one count. Id. The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's 170 EFTA0

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

tered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but one count. Id. The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's dismissal

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

tered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but one count. Id. The Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss a charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's 170 EFTA0

as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(e); (c) used a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice minor females, inclu

e your answer or motion with the court. Date: SEPTEMBER 177 2010 Steven M. Larimore Clerk of Court SUMMONS s/Gregory Maestre Deputy Clerk U.S. District Courts EFTA00729606 Intentionally Left Blank EFTA00729607 Case 9:10-cv-81111-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2010 Page 1 of 29 UNITED ST