Epstein Secrets

hat they were members of conspiracy pursuant to New York long-arm statute, or that they had any general business contacts with United States. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 302(a)(2). 68. Federal Courts C=97 Jurisdictional discovery was warrant- ed, at dismissal stage of Antiterrori

rrorism Act (ATA) suit by survivors of victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, as to issue whether company purposefully directed its activities at United Slates, for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 et seq.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(2), 28 U.S.CA. 101. Federal Civil Procedure (3=

ts with the United States generally, but in- sufficient contacts with any one state in particular. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note; United Stales v. Intl. Bhd, of Teamsters, 945 F.Supp. 609, 616- 17 (S.D.N.Y.1996). For jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), there must be a federal claim, personal

dismissed for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction. 3. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Jurisdic- tional Discovery as to Privatbank's Investing Activities in the United States [37] Plaintiffs point out that Privat- bank's website and its 2001 Annual Report state that Privatbank engages in transac- tions involving securiti

some conceivable non-discretionary tortious act falls within the purview of these generic allegations under the appli- cable substantive law. 28 U.S.C.A. 1605(a)(5). 28. International Law C=10.33 In determining whether functions are discretionary, for purposes of the discre- tionary function except

cludes the relevant period in this action and five preceding years. See In re Magnetic Au- diotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 207- 08; see also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 569-70 (holding that the time peri- od relevant for determining extent of a defendant's contacts for general jurisdic- tion purpose sho

concede that neither Jane Doe I nor Jane Doe 2 were victims of the crimes to which Epstein entered guilty pleas to on June 30, 2008. D.E. 416 at 40. The United States was not a party to the state court criminal proceeding against Epstein, nor had it initiated those proceedings. Despite all of these facts, petitio

uestion of law to be decided by this Court. "Statutory interpretation is a matter of law appropriate for resolution on summary judgment." Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011)(citation omitted). "Issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for su

concede that neither Jane Doe 1 nor Jane Doe 2 were victims of the crimes to which Epstein entered guilty pleas to on June 30, 2008. D.E. 416 at 40. The United States was not a party to the state court criminal proceeding against Epstein, nor had it initiated those proceedings. Despite all of these facts, petitio

uestion of law to be decided by this Court. "Statutory interpretation is a matter of law appropriate for resolution on summary judgment." Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011)(citation omitted). "Issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for su

includes the relevant period in this action and five preceding years. See In re Magnetic Au- diotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 207- 08; see also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 569-70 (holding that the time peri- od relevant for determining extent of a defendant’s contacts for general jurisdic- tion purpose shoul

fficient con- tacts with the United States as a whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any particu- lar state, requires contacts with the United States as a whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 50. Constitutional Law ¢=305(5) The due process minimum contacts

has sufficient con- tacts with the United States as a whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any particu- lar state, requires contacts with the United States as a whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 50. Constitutional Law ¢=305(5) The due process minimum co

t, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sover- eign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614, 112 S.Ct. 2160. Courts must in- quire whether the foreign state’s actions “are the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade a