Epstein Secrets

081 (4th Cir. 1981). Under the circumstances, any claim of privilege or work product cannot be accepted without further evidentiary substantiation. See United States'. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (where the allegations against one party could not subject another to civil or criminal liability, joi

nce law. Most Cited Cases In a diversity case, court applies federal law to resolve work product claims. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. [5j 04( Federal Civil Procedure 170A €=+ 16 2) 170A Federal Civil Procedure 170AX Depositions and Discovery 170AX(E) Discovery and Production

the law relating to inadvertent waiver of the attorney client privilege, not- ing that three distinct approaches had been followed by courts within the United States: a strict waiver approach, fmding waiver whenever a non-privileged disclos- ure occurs; a lenient approach: finding waiver only in the instance of

("Colorable claims of attor- ney-client and work product privilege [are] .. . a textbook example of an entitlement to intervention as of right."); United Stalest. AT & T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.1980); Sackman I. Liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In allowing intervention,

attorney, who also represented corporation, where attor- ney was not actively protecting that privi- lege. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 24(a), (aX2), 28 U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 501, 28 U.S.C.A.; N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 4503. 6. Witnesses o=>198(1) Existence of attorney-client privilege is based upon poli

to reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States'. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after s

minal sentences" to reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedin

1 and Jane Doe 2 can have no legitimate particularized need for grand jury materials that they intend to use in violation of the rules of evidence. See United States v. Capozzi, 486 F.3d 711, 727 (1st Cir. 2007) (no right to grand jury transcripts established by defendant who sought them to substantiate an appea

o reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after se

enying mandamus where petitioners sought to vacate plea agreement which made no provision for restitution in deference to pending civil litigation); United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2010) (relying on the "strong interest in the finality of criminal sentences" to reject mandamus under th

to reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after s

air the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, the only real purpose in seeking the plea negotiations is to offer them in evidence against M

0301864 mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after s

titled to discovery or use of the plea negotiations because plea negotiations enjoy an evidentiary privilege, as recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). Additionally, because plea negotiations are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust, and because

o reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after s

General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). The Act codifies the long-standing principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large

o reject mandamus under the Act where a defendant had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced more than two years earlier); see also United States v. Bedonie, 413 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court had no authority under mandatory restitution act to reopen restitution proceedings after s

gly expects this to happen. Congress adopted the CVRA with the express goal of making the new law "a formula [*855] for success" and a "model for our States." 111 Congress clearly wants the new law aggressively implemented, thereby avoiding the need for further legislative action or even, possibly, a fede

ll a "victim" of the conspiracy where her smuggler threatened her life and forced her to work as live-in maid once she had arrived); United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004) (holding that "victim" in manslaughter case under MVRA was murdered person himself and not the estate), rev'd on