Epstein Secrets

om he coerced into performing sex acts "behind the walls of his opulent waterfront mansion," among other locations, "as often as three times a day." Julie K. Brown, How ajiiture Trump Cabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a *time, Miami Herald (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.cominewsiloc

Media Company and investigative journalist Julie Brown, whose feature story about Epstein recently garne

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition." Id (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself—similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

om he coerced into performing sex acts "behind the walls of his opulent waterfront mansion," among other locations, "as often as three times a day." Julie K. Brown, How a future Trump Cabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a lifetime, Miami Herald (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/

Media Company and investigative journalist Julie Brown, whose feature story about Epstein recently garne

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.' Id. (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself-similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

any materials in the record. Accordingly, these assertions of privilege are inadequate. See Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003); Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F.Supp. 515, 520 Should the Court allow the Government to assert privilege with regard to any of the materials, the victims

icipation of litigation, and certainly not litigation about the Crime Victims' Rights Act. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, 549 (D. Ariz. 2002) (documents not protected by work product because not prepared in connection with case at hand). II. Specific Responses to

iled February 11, 2020). Access to other judicial documents in this action has already been granted to intervening private parties in interest, see Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019), and also is the subject of ongoing litigation before this Court. See, e.g., ECF No. 1096-1108. The 1 EFTA0

ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

roviding the Court with a list of broad and vague categories of reasons for maintaining nearly all of the motion papers in this matter under seal); Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868, Dkt. 149 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 2019) (listing in a cursory fashion several reasons that the summary judgment materials should r

[B]road allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy the test." In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 258 F.R.D. at 244; see also Tr. of Jan. 16, 2020 Conf. at 7:9-12, 21-23 ("[W]hat we are looking for from you is a specific Plaintiff is cognizant of the Court

iled February 11, 2020). Access to other judicial documents in this action has already been granted to intervening private parties in interest, see Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019), and also is the subject of ongoing litigation before this Court. See, e.g., ECF No. 1096-1108. The EFTA0007

ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

See supra p. 33. FN 10. See supra n. 2. FN I 1. Defendant's reliance on United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.1986), is misplaced. In Brown, the Eighth Circuit determined that the defend- ant had breached a cooperation agree- ment, thus permitting the government to prosecute him for the

ere, preventing Epstein from identifying Plaintiffs' in subpoenas and other type discovery overwhelmingly inhibits discovery. Ees Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 176 (E.D. P.A. 2001) (denying protective order where alleged sexual assault victim did not demonstrate a serious specific injury and allowing De

umption In favor of public access to the courts. Brown I. Advantage Engineer- The doctrine of ancillary

to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westlaw.contrint/printstream.aspers=WLW11.07&pbc=8C6E23F9,Sidecti n ObAPIAI EFTA00177915 Page 10 of 25 183 F.R.D. 458,51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 35 (Cite as: 183 F.R.D. 458) L . way that the attorney client priv- ilege can. Whether the information involved is fac

by any materials in the record. Accordingly, these assertions of privilege are inadequate. See Bogle. McClure, 332 F.3d 347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003); Brown' City of Margate, 842 F.Supp. 515, 520 Should the Court allow the Government to assert privilege with regard to any of the materials, the victims w

icipation of litigation, and certainly not litigation about the Crime Victims' Rights Act. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, 549 (D. Ariz. 2002) (documents not protected by work product because not prepared in connection with case at hand). II. Specific Responses to