Epstein Secrets

24 F.3d 65, 76-77 (1" Cir. 2005); United States' Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11`h Cir. 1995). The governmen

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

f an opportunity to engage in prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (ls' Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995). The government cannot fairly, or consistent with the rule of lenity, advocate a broader definition of the same t

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

of an opportunity to engage in prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (1" Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (I1th Cu. 1995). The government cannot fairly, or consistent with the rule of lenity, advocate a broader definition of the same te

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

e shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its foundation, on impermissibly elas

f an opportunity to engage in prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (ls' Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995). The government cannot fairly, or consistent with the rule of lenity, advocate a broader definition of the same t