Epstein Secrets

a and extremist groups like Hezbollah. If Iran gets a weapon, other countries in the region may want one, too. But while Israel's defense minster, Ehud Barak, suggested on Israel Radio Thursday that Iran had made significant progress toward acquiring weapons capability — citing what he said was a new Am

e, too. But while Israel's defense minster, Ehud Barak, suggested on Israel Radio Thursday that Iran ha

nt one, too. But while Israel's defense minster, Ehud Barak, suggested on Israel Radio Thursday that I

kers within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) -- the party created in 1962 to administer the state and serve as a source of power for Nasser -- forced Sadat to accept limits on his own presidential authority. The most important of these was a stipulation that he rule collectively, which meant that he w

elevision. But at the time, very few Israelis even knew who I was, and I felt ’'d done OK. I was surprised, however, when Rabin phoned the next day. “Ehud, I didn’t see it. I was attending some event,” he said. But his wife, Leah, had recorded the program. “I just watched it. I should tell you, I think

my hands — the article accused me of siding with the settlers. If blood was spilled in the weeks and months ahead, the newspaper said, “it will be on Barak’s hands.” Ordinarily, I would have ignored it. But never in my military career had I been similarly attacked on an issue of any importance. I was es

o let the facts get in the way of the “exclusive” it ran in its weekend edition on July 7. Under a banner headline — an undeniably clever Hebrew pun, Ehud Barakh, “Ehud Ran Away” — it accused me of having stood by, paralyzed with shock, when the missiles struck and then, as other officers tended to the wounded

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

elevision. But at the time, very few Israelis even knew who I was, and I felt I'd done OK. I was surprised, however, when Rabin phoned the next day. "Ehud, I didn't see it. I was attending some event," he said. But his wife, Leah, had recorded the program. "I just watched it. I should tell you, I think

my hands - the article accused me of siding with the settlers. If blood was spilled in the weeks and months ahead, the newspaper said, "it will be on Barak's hands." Ordinarily, I would have ignored it. But never in my military career had I been similarly attacked on an issue of any importance. I was esp

o let the facts get in the way of the "exclusive" it ran in its weekend edition on July 7. Under a banner headline - an undeniably clever Hebrew pun, Ehud Barakh, "Ehud Ran Away" - it accused me of having stood by, paralyzed with shock, when the missiles struck and then, as other officers tended to the wounded

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

time attack after all. Talking to Dado and me, he said: “Since we’re going to such lengths to deceive them, why not just add another layer? Why can’t Ehud’s people take the role of the airport mechanics?” Looking at each other, Dado and I realized it was a stroke of brilliance. Dado went to share the pl

hat before I’d left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011617 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I’d Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, were paratroopers who’d joined u

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabine

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. “Ehud, I’m sure we can topple the government,” he told me. “But only you know whether we’re ready — whether you ’re ready — to defeat Bibi in an election.”

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

time attack after all. Talking to Dado and me, he said: "Since we're going to such lengths to deceive them, why not just add another layer? Why can't Ehud's people take the role of the airport mechanics?" Looking at each other, Dado and I realized it was a stroke of brilliance. Dado went to share the pl

that before I'd left for Stanford, 146 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027994 they even insisted I change my name. I was no longer Ehud Brog. I'd Hebraicized it: to Barak, which seemed near enough to the original. Among the few dozen outside the unit who did know about my role, however, were paratroopers who'd joined u

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet

ed his no-confidence resolution, he came to see me in my office in the Knesset. He was worried. Not about the vote, but about what would come after. "Ehud, I'm sure we can topple the government," he told me. "But only you know whether we're ready - whether you're ready - to defeat Bibi in an election."

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. "Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn't complete the process," I pointed out. "They signed a "framework agreement' and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

, in 1995, and then with centrist Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in 2008. Twice, Abbas endorsed principles

lamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood it did so selectively because it still needed them to use as a bogeyman at home and abroad. Prior to Mubarak, Sadat used the Muslim Brotherhood to crush the Egyptian left and bury all the gains in social justice that had come with Abdel-Nasser. It is useful to r

ated debate, media reports said. Prime Minister Ehud Olniert, whose handling of the war has come und

ly orchestrated by Di. Kissinger, who managed to create enough distance between the Unit- ed States and Israel to allow some negotiating room. Mr. Sadat felt confident enough as the "hero of the crossing" to make his famous trip to Jerusalem. Even the terrorist group of the day, the Palestine Libe

moved to Tunis. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023152 --- PAGE BREAK --- OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxi 10 December 1978 President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are awarded jointly in Oslo the Nobel Peace Prize. 16 January 1979 Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran after months of do

of the Palestinian Charter which denied Israel’s right to exist. 7 February 1999 King Hussein of Jordan dies. Abdullah II succeeds him. 17 May 1999 Ehud Barak elected Prime Minister of Israel. 4 September 1999 = Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. 5 October 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_

- OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi xxiv Chronology 15 December 1999 President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara, followed by rounds of peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000. 5 March 2000 Government of