Epstein Secrets

e statutory provision," not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the "effect" of the secretive transportation, but also that "petitioner knew th

re. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States I Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base to minors, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 859(a)

ral prosecutors have pursued under the federal sta tes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States I Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base

e statutory provision," not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the "effect" of the secretive transportation, but also that "petitioner knew th

e. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base to minors, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 84I(a)(1), and 859(a)

l prosecutors have pursued under the federal statutes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base

ving one of these effects was a design (i.e. purpose) of the transportation" of currency. Cuellar v. United States, supra, 553 U.S., Slip op. At I (Alito, J. concurring). Similarly, it is not enough that one effect of a communication scheduling a visit between Mr. Epstein and a minor was that there mi

e. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United Stares v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base to minors, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 859(a)

ion of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and sex trafficking of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1591. United States v. Boehm, Case No. 3:04CR00003 (D. Alaska 2004). Boehm's actions, unlike Mr. Epstein's, also had a strong interstate nexus: Boehm purchased and distributed

ive statutory provision,” not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the “effect” of the secretive transportation, but also that “petitioner knew tha

ral prosecutors have pursued under the federal statutes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein’s case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base t

e statutory provision," not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the "effect" of the secretive transportation, but also that "petitioner knew th

l prosecutors have pursued under the federal statutes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by the prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base