Epstein Secrets

ted Nations, the most difficult part of any such operation might well be winning international approval. That EFTA00712618 did not stop President Clinton from intervening in Kosovo, and it need not stop it in Syria, particularly if we can win the backing of NATO and the Arab League. Max Boot is a co

ivil war is now destined to go on for years, whether the outside world intervenes or not. James P Rubin was assistant secretary of state during the Bill Clinton administration. Ankle 4. Asia Times An unwelcome turn in the Arab Spring? Brian M Downing Jun 5, 2012 -- The remarkable uprisings across the Ar

ional approval. That EFTA00712618 did not stop President Clinton from intervening in Kosovo, and it need not stop

an visited Bonn in the fall of 1977, he told then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt about neighboring Egypt's fear "that Israel might use nuclear weapons." Dayan said that he understood the Egyptians' worries, and pointed out that in his opinion the use of the bomb against the Aswan dam would have "devastati

me during this critical stage of Israel’s history, had guided me from the moment I became Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the White House and moving on to Camp David — I had mapped out at great length, in great detail, every

ut with guns and explosives — would be only a matter of time. I knew something else as well. This would be a moment of truth not just for me. Or for Bill Clinton, a man who understood our conflict more deeply, and was more determined to help us end it, than any other president before him. It was a moment of tr

Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the

ill alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at me, and added: “When I was 20 years younger than you are, I never waited for someone like Ben-Gurion or Dayan to ask me to plan an operation. I would plan it! Then I’d take it to them and say, you’re the politicians, you decide, but if you say yes, we'll do i

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I’m much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He’d met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

ndable. I was by no means the only former general to enter Israeli politics. Other chiefs-of-staff had gone on to play prominent roles in government: Dayan, Motta Gur and, of course, Rabin. But the fact that I was going directly into the cabinet, and so soon after leaving the army, was seen by the Israel

me during this critical stage of Israel’s history, had guided me from the moment I became Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the White House and moving on to Camp David — I had mapped out at great length, in great detail, every

ut with guns and explosives — would be only a matter of time. I knew something else as well. This would be a moment of truth not just for me. Or for Bill Clinton, a man who understood our conflict more deeply, and was more determined to help us end it, than any other president before him. It was a moment of tr

Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the

ill alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at me, and added: “When I was 20 years younger than you are, I never waited for someone like Ben-Gurion or Dayan to ask me to plan an operation. I would plan it! Then I’d take it to them and say, you’re the politicians, you decide, but if you say yes, we'll do i

central role meant the threat to Israel would be dramatically reduced. I'm much less sure whether the elder President Bush, whose election defeat to Bill Clinton came just two days before our final exercise in the Negev, would have agreed with the attack. After the victory in the Gulf War, Bush had deliberatel

ut international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He'd met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable deali

ld go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader.

ndable. I was by no means the only former general to enter Israeli politics. Other chiefs-of-staff had gone on to play prominent roles in government: Dayan, Motta Gur and, of course, Rabin. But the fact that I was going directly into the cabinet, and so soon after leaving the army, was seen by the Israel