Epstein Secrets

curred, and the running of the limitations period, if applicable, did not begin until she returned to Florida about 16 months ago, in October 2013. Jane Doe 3 has therefore filed her action within the three-year time period specified by § 2401(a) for persons returning to this country from beyond the seas.

ach, Florida, to Sydney, Australia, is 9,364 miles — and that travel between the two points would involve passing over the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, Jane Doe 3 was plainly "beyond the seas" when the events giving rise to her claim occurred, and the running of the limitations period, if applicable, did not b

hile a claimant is "beyond the seas," as in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), a court lacks the power to narrow the scope of the plain meaning of that phrase. See CBS Inc. I PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) (cautioning against allowing "clearly expressed legislative decisions... [to] be

ee Duke University School of Law & University of Virginia's Legal Data Lab, Data and flonimp.nts, Corporate

v. Beck's Est., 129 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1942))). Where, as here, the language Congress used is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is complete. CBS Inc. it PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001). We are bound to "presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it s

ation that he committed at least one predicate offense as alleged by Jane Doe 103, a waiver sufficient to satisfy the 2255 statutory condition that Jane Doe 103 was a victim of the commission of one of the enumerated predicate violations as required. 4 EFTA00233493 statutory text is there any reference t

ture said what it means and means what it said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in 2 EFTA00233491 CBS Inc. supra at 1228 — "Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and un