Epstein Secrets

em, they turned to terrorism only when they were unable to bring about the grand popular revolutions they sought. Perhaps the worst mistake of the Bush administration's response to 9/11 was to make terrorism itself America's principal target. Terrorism was never more than a symptom of this dysfunct

aside though it was — at least deserves credit for finally recognizing the real source of America's problems in the Middle East. The great shame of George W. Bush's presidency is that the war on terrorism was not a smaller adjunct to that broader effort, rather than the other way around. We have no one but our

ems in the Middle East. The great shame of George W. Bush's presidency is that the war on terrorism w

he public space, there was now the cult of the rulers, the unbounded power of Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The traditional restraints on power had been swept away, and no new social contract between ruler and ruled had emerged. Fear

er of freedom, but nor did the Iraqi example prove the subversive beacon of hope its proponents had expected. It was said by Arabs themselves that George W. Bush had unleashed a tsunami on the region. True, but the Arabs were good at waiting out storms, and before long, the Americans EFTA_R1_00234068 EFTA0

he quest. An election in 2006 in the Palestinian territories went the way of Hamas, and a new disillusionment with democracy's verdict overtook the Bush administration. The "surge" in Iraq rescued the American war there just in time, but the more ambitious vision of reforming the Arab world was giv

ted. It was said by Arabs themselves that George W. Bush had unleashed a tsunami on the region. True

in Tahrir Square demanding to be rid of him. The senior commanders of the armed forces cast him aside, and he joined his fellow despot, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had fallen a month earlier. From Cairo, the awakening became a pan-Arab affair, catching fire in Yemen and Bahrain. As a monarchy, th

mple, in the Iraq war — that furthered this democratic revolution, but rather its soft power — Twitter and Facebook — which was much maligned under George W. Bush and his neocon advisers. Silicon Valley, it seems, has more potency than the Pentagon. These digital tools from the United States became the instr

acebook — which was much maligned under George W. Bush and his neocon advisers. Silicon Valley, it seem

Facebook — which was much maligned under George W. Bush and his neocon advisers. Silicon Valley, it

s. The government was authoritarian but also determinedly secular and pro- Western. The cracks, however, were larger than anyone thought: President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had carefully hidden the extent to which illness had weakened his control of the government; his ties with other centers of power, such as

em, they turned to terrorism only when they were unable to bring about the grand popular revolutions they sought. Perhaps the worst mistake of the Bush administration's response to 9/11 was to make terrorism itself America's principal target. Terrorism was never more than a symptom of this dysfunct

aside though it was — at least deserves credit for finally recognizing the real source of America's problems in the Middle East. The great shame of George W. Bush's presidency is that the war on terrorism was not a smaller adjunct to that broader effort, rather than the other way around. We have no one but our

ems in the Middle East. The great shame of George W. Bush's presidency is that the war on terrorism w

he public space, there was now the cult of the rulers, the unbounded power of Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The traditional restraints on power had been swept away, and no new social contract between ruler and ruled had emerged. Fear

lessly unsentimental view of the world. While Netanyahu and the gerontocrats of the American Jewish establishment yearn for a return to the days of George W. Bush, Fayyad has developed a strategy for the post-American age. He knows that if Netanyahu continues to EFTA00586644 13 entrench the occupation and

ment yearn for a return to the days of George W. Bush, Fayyad has developed a strategy for the post-Am

ishment yearn for a return to the days of George W. Bush, Fayyad has developed a strategy for the po

that in fact Hamdi had not struck him—and she was acquitted). But there was enough tension and discontent within the country—and in particular with Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali— that had it not been for the unfortunate Bouazizi, some other incident might well have caused the overthrow of the regime. Next, for a rev