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uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur
ing concealment or "cover-ups" were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide a bill of particula
uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur
ing concealment or "cover-ups" were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide a bill of particula
uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur
ing concealment or "cover-ups" were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide a bill of particula
uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur
ing concealment or "cover-ups" were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide a bill of particula
uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur
ing concealment or "cover-ups" were not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although the Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosecution to provide a bill of particula
Entities connected to both Adriana Ross and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Ghislaine Maxwell
PERSON
United States
LOCATIONthe Southern District
LOCATION
Julie K. Brown
PERSON
Bradley Edwards
PERSONJane Doe
PERSON
Department of Justice
ORGANIZATIONMaria Farmer
PERSON
Scarlett Johansson
PERSON
Virginia Giuffre
PERSON
Stephen Hawking
PERSON
Alexander Acosta
PERSON
Michael Jackson
PERSONMartin Weinberg
PERSON
Marc Rich
PERSON
Supreme Court
ORGANIZATION
George Mitchell
PERSONDoug Band
PERSON
Kenneth Marra
PERSON