Epstein Secrets

ion"). One does not need to engage in complex analysis to understand what has happened here: the government has sought to substitute our client for Jeffrey Epstein, even if it means stretching—and ultimately exceeding—the bounds of the law. Yet, it is in precisely this setting—involving a defendant who, despit

en short of its obligations here. The indictment must be dismissed. The government's sudden zeal to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for alleged conduct with Epstein in the 1990s—conduct for which the government never even charged Epstein—follows a history that is both highly unusual and deeply troubling. The gov

ohen Christian R. Everdell COHEN & GRESSER LLP Jeffrey S. Pagliuca Laura A. Menninger HADDON, MORGAN &

cuted, when such language is included as to Epstein, must be presumed under contract interpretation principles to have been intentional. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, 424 F.3d at 206; Port Consot, 826 F. App'x at 827-28. At minimum, the silence as to time period and covered conduct is an ambiguity and therefore s

eople who achieve great power and wealth, JeffIre]y Epstein exploited the Halo effect to surround himself wi

eliable evidence through a witness plainly incompetent to do so. None of the charges in this case relate in any way to the defendant's appraisal of Jeffrey Epstein's character or whether the defendant did or did not view him in the manner suggested by the Halo effect. Simply put, if every word that Dr. Dietz said

notes that "Dr. Dietz is also prepared to address Jeffrey Epstein's sexual behavior should it prove releva

ts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury's."). Nor may an expert opine as to a party's state of mind, credibility, intent, or motive. See LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass 'n v. CIBC Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8426 (WHP) (HBP), 2012 WL 466785, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Highland Cap

ion"). One does not need to engage in complex analysis to understand what has happened here: the government has sought to substitute our client for Jeffrey Epstein, even if it means stretching—and ultimately exceeding—the bounds of the law. Yet, it is in precisely this setting—involving I defendant who, despit

en short of its obligations here. The indictment must be dismissed. The government's sudden zeal to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for alleged conduct with Epstein in the 1990s—conduct for which the government never even charged Epstein—follows I history that is both highly unusual and deeply troubling. The gov

overnment has sought to substitute our client for Jeffrey Epstein, even if it means stretching—and ultimat

cuted, when such language is included as to Epstein, must be presumed under contract interpretation principles to have been intentional. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, 424 F.3d at 206; Port Consol., 826 F. App'x at 827-28. At minimum, the silence as to time period and covered conduct is an ambiguity and therefore