Epstein Secrets

15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (hereinafter, the "State Attorney's Office") have conducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter "Epstein"); IT APPEARING that the State Attorney's Office has charged Epstein by indictment with solicitation of prostitution, in viol

he relitigation of which is barred by a prior federal nonprosecution agreement (the "NPA"). The government makes this drastic demand even though Mr. Epstein has never once attempted to flee the United States — despite a Florida federal judge's stated belief that he could void the NPA in appropriate circ

Street New York, NY 10007 RE: United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, Criminal No. 19-490 Dear Judge Berman:

government makes this drastic demand even though Mr. Epstein has never once attempted to flee the United Stat

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "11) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec

15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (hereinafter, the "State Attorney's Office") have conducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter "Epstein"); IT APPEARING that the State Attorney's Office has charged Epstein by indictment with solicitation of prostitution, in viol

he relitigation of which is barred by a prior federal nonprosecution agreement (the "NPA"). The government makes this drastic demand even though Mr. Epstein has never once attempted to flee the United States — despite a Florida federal judge's stated belief that he could void the NPA in appropriate circ

Street New York, NY 10007 RE: United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, Criminal No. 19-490 Dear Judge Berman:

government makes this drastic demand even though Mr. Epstein has never once attempted to flee the United Stat

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "11) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec

legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners se

oners seek "is to invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non- Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non- Prosecution Agreeme

secution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the So

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec

legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners se

oners seek "is to invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non- Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non- Prosecution Agreeme

secution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the So

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec

legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners se

oners seek "is to invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non- Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non- Prosecution Agreeme

secution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the So

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec

legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant to the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners se

oners seek "is to invalidate the non-prosecution agreement"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights under the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the Non- Prosecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the Non- Prosecution Agreeme

secution Agreement that was entered into between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the So

ues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court."' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)). When evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial dec