Epstein Secrets

lusions and Recommendations I. Conclusions Our investigation and review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), includin

sifying BOP records relating to inmate counts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures, which compromised Epstein’s safety, the safety of other inmates, and the security of the institution. Specifically, we found that MCC New York staff failed to undertake requ

Prisons’ (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures

safety and security concerns. In the years since Mr. Epstein's death, the BOP has updated its process related

Inspections Division Report 16-02 (March 2016); U.S. DOJ OIG, Review of the Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 15-05 (May 2015). Additionally, multiple remote inspections the OIG conducted as part of its pandemic response oversight work revealed that

lusions and Recommendations I. Conclusions Our investigation and review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), includin

sifying BOP records relating to inmate counts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies and procedures, which compromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates, and the security of the institution. Specifically, we found that MCC New York staff failed to undertake requi

Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures

safety and security concerns. In the years since Mr. Epstein's death, the BOP has updated its process related

and Inspections Division Report 16-02 (March 2016); U.S. DOJ OIG, Review oftheimport of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Pr/cons Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 15-05 (May 2015). Additionally, multiple remote inspections the OIG conducted as part of its pandemic response oversight work revealed that s

a contingency plan for cellmate reassignment, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. The OIG's Epstein report found that there was no contingency plan in place to assign Epstein a new cellmate when his then- cellmate was transferred out of the Metropo

eau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New Y

eau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center

Issues, Report Number 23-065 (Limited-Scope Review). Please report any additional updates on the BOP's response to this recommendation to the OIG's Evaluation and Inspections Division in connection with the Limited- Scope Review. The OIG will close this recommendation when it closes Recommendation 5 from the Limited-Scope Review.

eau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New Y

eau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center

a contingency plan for cellmate reassignment, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. The OIG's Epstein report found that there was no contingency plan in place to assign Epstein a new cellmate when his then- cellmate was transferred out of the Metropo

Issues, Report Number 23-065 (Limited-Scope Review). Please report any additional updates on the BOP's response to this recommendation to the OIG's Evaluation and Inspections Division in connection with the Limited- Scope Review. The OIG will close this recommendation when it closes Recommendation 5 from the Limited-Scope Review.

during his shift. The OIG's analysis of the SHU security camera video revealed that after approximately 10:40 p.m., no Correctional Officer entered Epstein's tier in the SHU until just before 6:30 a.m. when Noel and Thomas began to serve breakfast to the inmates. The OIG investigation and review conclu

n Natchez Mississipp4 Audit Division Report 17-08 (December 2016); U.S. DOJ 01G, Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Mediral Staffing (hallows Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 16-02 (March 2016); U.D. DOJ OIG, Review of the Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons Evaluation and Inspecti

ctor General's (OIG) Final Report dated June 26, 2023: Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) appreciates the opportunity to provide a respons

eau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center

a contingency plan for cellmate reassignment, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. The OIG's Epstein report found that there was no contingency plan in place to assign Epstein a new cellmate when his then-cellmate was transferred out of the Metropol

Issues, Report Number 23-065 (Limited-Scope Review). Please report any additional updates on the BOP's response to this recommendation to the OIG's Evaluation and Inspections Division in connection with the Limited-Scope Review. The OIG will close this recommendation when it closes Recommendation 5 from the Limited-Scope Review.