Epstein Secrets

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ

cution Agreement. See Mazzoni Farms, 761 So. 2d at 313 (concluding that "[a] prerequisite to rescission is placing the other party in status quo"); Renfrow v. First Mortg. America, Inc., 2011 WL 2416247, *3 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2011) (Marra, J.) ("restoring the parties to the status quo ante is an elemen

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ

cution Agreement. See Mazzoni Farms, 761 So. 2d at 313 (concluding that "[a] prerequisite to rescission is placing the other party in status quo"); Renfrow v. First Mortg. America, Inc., 2011 WL 2416247, *3 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2011) (Marra, J.) ("restoring the parties to the status quo ante is an elemen

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ

cution Agreement. See Mazzoni Farms, 761 So. 2d at 313 (concluding that "[a] prerequisite to rescission is placing the other party in status quo"); Renfrow v. First Mortg. America, Inc., 2011 WL 2416247, *3 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2011) (Marra, J.) ("restoring the parties to the status quo ante is an elemen