Epstein Secrets

s have recognized state law evidentiary privileges in particular cases when to do so would not substantially burden federal policies. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y.); cf. ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1342-45 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). FN6. In their briefs, appellants suggest th

a witness' testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot be used as the basis of a defamation action. See, e.g., State v. Tinett, Ill So.2d 716 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1959). Iv. In light of our conclusion that appellants have no privilege of nondisclosure under state law, we affirm the district court's o

s have recognized state law evidentiary privileges in particular cases when to do so would not substantially burden federal policies. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y.); cf. ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336. 1342-45 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). P146. In their briefs, appellants suggest

a witness' testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot be used as the basis of a defamation action. See, e.g., Stare v. Mika, 111 So.2d 716 (Fla.Dist.Q.App.19.59). IV. In light of our conclusion that appellants have no privilege of nondisclosure under state law, we affirm the district court's o

s have recognized state law evidentiary privileges in particular cases when to do so would not substantially burden federal policies. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y.); cf. ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1342-45 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). R46. In their briefs, appellants suggest th

a witness' testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot be used as the basis of a defamation anion. See, e.g.. State v. Tiller, Ill So.2d 716 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1959). IV. In light of our conclusion that appellants have no privilege of nondisclosure under state law, we affirm the district court's o