Epstein Secrets

(citing United States v. Griffith , 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum , 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton , 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1982)). Instead, the court concluded that the Gove

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

(citing United States v. Griffith , 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum , 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton , 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1982)). Instead, the court concluded that the Gove

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

(citing United States v. Griffith , 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum , 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton , 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1982)). Instead, the court concluded that the Gove

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing