Epstein Secrets

" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

im" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

" under this statute, cannot be charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent