Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

unpersuaded: The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made knowingly to further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or intended that they would travel across state lines is immaterial. Id. at 1313. In Drury, the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the d

unpersuaded: The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made knowingly to further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or intended that they would travel across state lines is immaterial. Id. at 1313. In Drury , the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

unpersuaded: The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made knowingly to further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or intended that they would travel across state lines is immaterial. Id. at 1313. In Drury , the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

unpersuaded: The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made knowingly to further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or intended that they would travel across state lines is immaterial. Id. at 1313. In Drury , the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing