Epstein Secrets

17, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney W , Chief, Criminal Division , MAUSA, Northern Region Chief, Northern Region 1. Introduction This memorandum seeks approval for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Epstein, M, a

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

il 30, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney M a, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region , Chief, Northern Region 1. Introduction This memorandum se sairoval for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Epstein, a/k/a

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

7) (2nd Revision 2/19/08)' To From R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney First Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region , Chief, Northern Region I. Introduction This memorandum seeks approval for the attached indictment char in Jeffrey Epstein, Min

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

r Date May 1, 2007 To R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region Chief, Northern Region I. Introduction From a(' This memorandum seeks approval for the attached indictment charm Jeffrey Epste

ly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

2/19/08) a ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney M, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region Chief, Northern Region I. Introduction This memorandum seeks a royal for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Epstein, a/k/

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

ed 9/13/07) ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney M, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region Chief, Northern Region May 1, 2007 I. Introduction This memorandum seeks a royal for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Ep

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

23, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney M, I Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Region , Chief, Northern Region 1. Introduction This memorandum seeks a royal for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Epstein, a/k

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s