Epstein Secrets

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

vis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi

is, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

vis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis