Epstein Secrets

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

1980); In re Katz , 623 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

. 1980); In re Katz , 623 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1980); United States I Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact

ir. 1980); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn, the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still b