Epstein Secrets

s that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

rimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

es that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do s

rposes of Doe, and, thus, the subpoenas are enforceable (regardless of the computers' contents). Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)." "As explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a b