Epstein Secrets

ial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Com

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe I United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis I United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Comp

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). -15- EFTA00179114 B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the

rposes of Doe, and, thus, the subpoenas are enforceable (regardless of the computers' contents). Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)." "As explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a b