Epstein Secrets

ial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Com

ial burden on the government to prove a grand jury subpoena is necessary and relevant." In re Impounded , 241 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting R. Enter , supra , 498 U.S. at 298-99). See also Blair v. United States , 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (a grand jury witness cannot refuse to respond to a subpoe

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe I United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis I United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Comp

ial burden on the government to prove a grand jury subpoena is necessary and relevant." In re Impounded , 241 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting R. Enter , supra , 498 U.S. at 298-99). See also Blair I United States , 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (a grand jury witness cannot refuse to respond to a subpoen

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). -15- EFTA00179114 B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the

if there is a reasonable possibility that the materials sought by the government will produce information relevant to the grand jury investigation. R. Enter., 498 U.S. at 300. Despite these broad powers, Epstein objects to the subpoenas that specifically call for and describe three computers, arguing th