Epstein Secrets

ial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Com

s that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe I United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis I United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Comp

rimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). -15- EFTA00179114 B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the

es that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which respondent now invites us to approve. We decline to do s