Epstein Secrets

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

ial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Com

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe I United States , 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis I United States , 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the Production of the Comp

lements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns—specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense- specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repres

cial entity, not a natural person, and therefore has no Fifth Amendment privilege at all. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). -15- EFTA00179114 B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine Also Do Not Bar the