Epstein Secrets

t at the wrong time. Of the three, only Halutz seemed ready to take personal responsibility. Even before the report came out, he resigned. Olmert and Peretz were determined to stay put, despite calls to quit not just from the opposition but from Tzipi Livni. Inside Labor as well, the war produced a clamor

f the Labor Party and a private citizen. But when the commission of inquiry released its report in April 2007, three people were singled out: Olmert, Amir Peretz and Halutz. Olmert was portrayed as a military novice who’d gone into battle without understanding the wartime role and responsibilities of a Prime M

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

ainst the other challenger, the longtime labor- union leader Amir Peretz, who was running on a platform to take Labor out of Sharon's government. But Peretz won the leadership election. He did leave the cabinet, forcing Arik to call an early election for March 2006. And that, along with the most ambitious

he year, when it was clear I wasn't going to win, I threw my support behind Shimon and against the other challenger, the longtime labor- union leader Amir Peretz, who was running on a platform to take Labor out of Sharon's government. But Peretz won the leadership election. He did leave the cabinet, forcing Ar

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

t at the wrong time. Of the three, only Halutz seemed ready to take personal responsibility. Even before the report came out, he resigned. Olmert and Peretz were determined to stay put, despite calls to quit not just from the opposition but from Tzipi Livni. Inside Labor as well, the war produced a clamor

f the Labor Party and a private citizen. But when the commission of inquiry released its report in April 2007, three people were singled out: Olmert, Amir Peretz and Halutz. Olmert was portrayed as a military novice who'd gone into battle without understanding the wartime role and responsibilities of a Prime M

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

he year, when it was clear I wasn’t going to win, I threw my support behind Shimon and against the other challenger, the longtime labor- union leader Amir Peretz, who was running on a platform to take Labor out of Sharon’s government. But Peretz won the leadership election. He did leave the cabinet, forcing A

inst the other challenger, the longtime labor- union leader Amir Peretz, who was running on a platform to take Labor out of Sharon’s government. But Peretz won the leadership election. He did leave the cabinet, forcing Arik to call an early election for March 2006. And that, along with the most ambitious

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks