Epstein Secrets

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

mize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldnonexcut.

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

mize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas--have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may no

does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olcinonexcut