Epstein Secrets

der the law that existed when the con uct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & trt Corp . B mo 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

2318. As the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly has explained, "where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling." Delgado,. United States Att'y Gen. 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citati

endment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 Minn. L.Rev. 2205. 2216 (2009) (internal citations omitted). As Justice Scalia wrote. "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the

able suspicion to border searches of electronic devices. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Linarez—Delgado. 259 Fed.Appx. 506, 508 (3d Cir.2007). For instance, in Ickes (as in Arnold ) the defendant•appellant argued that a reasonable suspicion requireme

nion is like a pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated ...."). The dissents commit a basic error of statutory interpretation by reading subsections (a)(5), (aX8), and (dX3) in isolation with

on regardless of the relief sought, it would have been unnecessary to carve out money damages explicitly from the panoply of potential relief. See? Delgado it U.S. All5P Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[W]here Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controllin