Epstein Secrets

In cases such as this one, contrary to plaintiffs' argument, Perlman does not directly conflict with Mohawk See Opposition at 3.In United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2010), a case not cited by the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit permitted an interlocutory appeal by intervenors under Perlman

lack of awareness that Perlman had ever been applied outside the grand jury context, Opposition at 6, but a quick Westlaw search demonstrates that Penman has often been applied outside the grand jury context. See, e.g., Gotham Holdings, LP v. 7 EFTA00583460 D. The United States is a Disinterested

ar. Co., 244 F.2d 158, 162 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1955), a civil case. In just the few years since Mohawk, the Fourth Circuit found jurisdiction based on Penman in a civil case, Mezu v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising u

tion are held by a disinterested party who is likely "to forgo suffering a contempt citation and appealing in favor of disclosure," United States I Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2010). As the Seventh Circuit explained about the scope of the Perlman doctrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

tion are held by a disinterested party who is likely "to forgo suffering a contempt citation and appealing in favor of disclosure," United States I Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2010). As the Seventh Circuit explained about the scope of the Perlman doctrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

tion are held by a disinterested party who is likely "to forgo suffering a contempt citation and appealing in favor of disclosure," United States I Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2010). As the Seventh Circuit explained about the scope of the Perlman doctrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E