Epstein Secrets

nment to identify the co-conspirator statements it plans to use at trial in its initial round of pretrial motions. There, the defendant argued that the Second Circuit's practice of conditional admission of co-conspirator statements at trial would prejudice her because "any cautionary instruction would be of doubtful

ich evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible for any purpose other than to show a defendant's criminal propensity." United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the defendant claims her conduct has an innocent explanation, the admiss

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

United States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 138, 140, 147 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 165 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 165 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 82, 110 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 201

w, and should be denied. 1. Martindell Provides No Basis to Grant the Relief the Defendant Seeks Maxwell argues that the Government "circumvented" the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell and "violated Maxwell's rights," which requires suppression of the evidence the Government obtained from the subpoena. (Def.

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, 165 EFTA00095257 uncharged

w, and should be denied. 1. Martindell Provides No Basis to Grant the Relief the Defendant Seeks Maxwell argues that the Government "circumvented" the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell and "violated Maxwell's rights," which requires suppression of the evidence the Government obtained from the subpoena. (Def.

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, uncharged acts are admissible