Epstein Secrets

s "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00100143 evidentiary details of its case"' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00077808 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00039623 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

particulars request as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the evidentiary details of its case" (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00103201 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 41 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 248, 250 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 268 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) 298, 300 United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 41 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 248, 250 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 268 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) 298, 300 United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 41 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 248, 250 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 268 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) 298, 300 United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 31 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 163, 164 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 176 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) 205, 208 ix EFTA00095076 United States v. Bin Lad

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 41 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 248, 250 United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 268 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) 298, 300 United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d

rcuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr