Epstein Secrets

s "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00100143 evidentiary details of its case"' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00100167 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00077808 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00077832 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00039623 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00039647 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

particulars request as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the evidentiary details of its case" (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selecting the jury from t

that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahia again illustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the retrial "to accommodate trial congestion in the court's calendar during a period of judicial emergency . . . ." United States v. Soares, 66

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00103201 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00103225 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury