Epstein Secrets

s "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00100143 evidentiary details of its case"' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00077808 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00039623 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

particulars request as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the evidentiary details of its case" (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 176 EFTA00103201 evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the manner in which it

r was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different "relevant jury pools" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta