Epstein Secrets

lic information (18, 32, 33), our results confirm that this strategy is too strict and unforgiving when information is private and noisy (34-36). Evolutionary Dynamics. Next we explore how likely a leading-eight strategy would evolve when population members can change their strategies over time. We first consider

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ol 240: 521-530. 131. Michor PW, D Mumford (2006). Riemannian geometries on spaces of plane curves. .I Eur Math Soc 8: 1.48. 132. Nowak MA (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 133. Nowak MA (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314: 1560-1563. 134. Nowak MA,

(2006). Early maternal investment in mice: No evidence for 'compatible-genes' sexual selection despite hybrid vigor. J Evol Biol 19: 922-928. 144. Santos FC, JM Pacheco, T Lenaens (2006). Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput Biol 2: e140. 145. Santos FC, JM Pacheco

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