Epstein Secrets

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ly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium condition no longer implies evolutionary s

this is the probability that a newly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium cond

s of finite size (Schaffer 1988, Kandori et al 1993, Kandori & Rob 1995, Schreiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Scheuring 2006, Imhof & Nowak 2006, Lessard & Ladret 2007). Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent M

equivalent to PA C 1/N, where PA is the fixation probability of an A mutant in a population of B individuals (Nowak et al 2004a, Ohtsuki et al 2007, Imhof et al 2006, Lessard and Ladret 2007). The above condition can thus be interpreted as follows: in a 2 x 2 game with mixed strategies, pure strategy