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r's strategy is given by a pair (a, a The first component I. Alexander R (1987) The &obey of Moral sntems (Aldine de Cayter, New Toth). 2. Rand DG, Nowak MA (2012) Human cooperation. Trends Cogn Ski 117:413-425. 3. Malls AP, Semmann D (2010) How Is human cooperation different? PAWS Trans A Soc 8 365:266
(2009) Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games (con &hate 67:399-407. 5. Mcquet ), Revert C, Traulsen A, Milins1/41 M (2011) Shame and honour drive cooper- ation. Biel Lett 7:899-901. Hilbe et el. 9NAS Latest Articles I 5 of 6 EFTA00803982 6. Oht
idge, UK). 47. Szolnoki A. Szabo G (2004) Phase transitions for rock-scissorypaper game on different networks. Mys Rev E 70037102 48. Claussen 1C, Traulsen A (2008) Cyclic dominance and biodiversity it well-mixed populations, Phys ROV Lett 100:058104. 09. Szolnoki A, et al. (2014) Cyclic dominance in e
R Soc B 270: 2017-2024. 13. Mitchener G, MA Nowak (2003). Competitive exclusion and coexistence of universal grammars. B Math Biol 65: 67-93. 14. Nowak MA, F Michor, Y Iwasa (2003). The linear process of somatic evolution. P Nail Acad Sci USA 100: 14966-14969. 15. Rajagopalan H, MA Nowak, B Vogelstein
K Grochow, A Jacobson, CK Liu, Z Popovik, R Travers (2005). Dance reveals symmetry especially in young men. Nature 438: T148-T150. 64. Claussen J, Traulsen A (2005). Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process. Phys Rev E 71: 025101. 65. Do
ki H, MA Nowak (2006). The replicator equation on graphs. J thcor Biol 243: 86-97. Page 6 of 16 EFTA_R1_01519430 EFTA02443864 139. Pacheco 3M, A Traulsen, MA Nowak (2006). Active linking in evolutionary games. J theor Biol 243: 437-443. 140. Pacheco JM, A Traulsen, MA Nowak (2006). Coevolution of str
, 2009a. Strategy abundance in 2x2 games for arbitrary mutation rates. J. Theor. Biol. 257, 340-344. [4] Antal T, Ohtsuki H, Wakeley .J, Taylor PD, Nowak MA, 2009b. Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space. PNAS, to appear. [5] Antal, T. and Scheming, I., 2006. Fixation of strategies for an evoluti
s of finite size (Schaffer 1988, Kandori et al 1993, Kandori & Rob 1995, Schreiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Scheuring 2006, Imhof & Nowak 2006, Lessard & Ladret 2007). Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent M
Entities connected to both Nowak MA and Traulsen

Martin Nowak
PERSON
Harvard University
ORGANIZATIONEvolutionary Dynamics
ORGANIZATION
Lieberman
PERSONCourtney Wild
PERSONEmmy Taylor
PERSONSantos FC
LOCATION
Morgan Stanley
ORGANIZATIONDepartment of Mathematics
ORGANIZATIONRobert Trivers
PERSONImhof
PERSONWright-Fisher
ORGANIZATION
Cambridge University Press
ORGANIZATIONRand DG
PERSON
George W. Bush
PERSON
Sigmund K
PERSONJ Theor Biol
PERSON
Hauert
PERSON
McLean
PERSON
Stanford University
LOCATION