Epstein Secrets

e level of conduct that triggers an exception to the work product doctrine. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 401, 244 U.S. App. D.C. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (exception to attorney- client privilege applied where alleged wrongdoing included "perjured testimony, document destruction, and similar mis

dily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 94 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions [13] about whom to prosecute be

uct" does not rise to the level of conduct that triggers an exception to the work product doctrine. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (exception to attorney-client privilege applied where alleged wrongdoing included "perjured testimony, document destruction, and similar mis

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s

uct" does not rise to the level of conduct that triggers an exception to the work product doctrine. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (exception to attorney-client privilege applied where alleged wrongdoing included "perjured testimony, document destruction, and similar mis

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[lin addition to assessing the s

nduct" does not rise to the level of conduct that triggers an exception to the work product doctrine. See, e.g. In re Sealed Case 754 F.2d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (exception to attorney-client privilege applied where alleged wrongdoing included "perjured testimony, document destruction, and similar mis

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s