Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

's] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing