Epstein Secrets

that "when the person who asserts a privilege is a non-litigant," "an appeal from a final judgment [will] be inadequate." In Holt-Ousted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 2011), the plaintiffs sought to take an interlocutory appeal from an order compelling the testimony of their former attorney

lack of awareness that Perlman had ever been applied outside the grand jury context, Opposition at 6, but a quick Westlaw search demonstrates that Penman has often been applied outside the grand jury context. See, e.g., Gotham Holdings, LP v. 7 EFTA00583460 D. The United States is a Disinterested

ar. Co., 244 F.2d 158, 162 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1955), a civil case. In just the few years since Mohawk, the Fourth Circuit found jurisdiction based on Penman in a civil case, Mezu v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising u

so In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625 F.3d at 572 (rul

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

so In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625 F.3d at 572 (rul

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

so In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the grand jury context"); Holt-Orstedl. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Perlman jurisdiction remains when a nonparty asserts a privilege); Krane, 625 F.3d at 572 (rul

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E