Epstein Secrets

] to New Mexico" and was "inappropriate" with her. Id. She was reluctant to go into details about her experience with Mr. Epstein. Id. at 73. Ms. Fanner opposes Mr. Epstein's pretrial release because she believes other Epstein victims would "continu[e] to be victimized" and that Mr. Epstein's wealt

release." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the `special prov- ince' of the district court." Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 610. At the outset, it should be noted that the Pretrial Services Report, dated July 12, 2019, concludes that: "The defendant

C. § 3142(g). "The weight afforded to each factor under section 3142(g) is within the 'special prov- ince of the district court." United States v. Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting United States v. Shaker, 817 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)). 313 [9] "The rules concerning admi

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

ited States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 205, 209, 210, 220 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 252 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 253 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 115, 161, 162 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

United States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) 138, 140, 147 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 165 United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) 165 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 82, 110 United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 201

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, 165 EFTA00095257 uncharged

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402." United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulin, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, uncharged acts are admissible