Epstein Secrets

at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has di

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has di

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has di

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F.Supp.2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). The defendant cites no authority in which a court has dismiss

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has di

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable