Epstein Secrets

McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2009) 260 xvii EFTA00077623 United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558 (2d Cir. 2009) 257 United States v. Medina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) 261 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) 252, 292 United States

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre- trial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature." (quoting United States v. Medina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014)1); United States v. Dwnitru, No. 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703, at *1 (S.D

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2009) 260 xvii EFTA00039438 United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558 (2d Cir. 2009) 257 United States v. Medina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) 261 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) 252, 292 United States

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre- trial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature." (quoting United States v. Medina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014)1); United States v. Dwnitru, No. 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703, at *1 (S.D

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

100 United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2009) 170 United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558 (2d Cir. 2009) 168 United States v. Medina, 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) 170 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) 165, 200 United States v. M

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre-trial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature." (quoting United States v. Medina, 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014))); United States v. 170 EFTA00095262 Dumitru, 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre- trial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature." (quoting United States v. Medina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014))); United States v. Dumitru, No. 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703, at *1 (S.D

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame