Epstein Secrets

f the alleged conspiracy ... is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to 'other crimes, wrongs, or ads' evidence, under which

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

of the alleged conspiracy . is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' evidence, under which

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

of the alleged conspiracy . is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' evidence, under which

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

of the alleged conspiracy . is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' evidence, under which

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

f the alleged conspiracy ... is not an `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit "follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' evidence, under which

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable