Epstein Secrets

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

te to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell contends that the allegations related to "Minor Victim-3" are surplusage because the indictment

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

te to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell contends that the allegations related to "Minor Victim-3" are surplusage because the indictment

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

te to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell contends that the allegations related to "Minor Victim-3" are surplusage because the indictment